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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of penalties in the tax code seems to be drifting away from 
long-held and well-established policy principles, with the gradual 
erosion resulting in both unintended consequences and increasing 
administrative challenges.  The current disarray of penalties in the 
 
∗ Contributing Editor, Tax Analysts.  The author is deeply indebted to Chris Rizek for his insightful 
guidance on this subject, and thanks the many practitioners of the tax bar who continue to serve as 
mentors.  
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present tax code is obvious.  Critics rightly condemn the present penalty 
regime as confusing, draconian, and unfair.  But despite growing calls 
for action, so far Congress does not seem very receptive to the message 
and continues to propose penalty provisions at odds with accepted goals.  
The last successful attempt at bringing order to a chaotic structure 
of penalty provisions in the tax code occurred in 1989.  Like today, 
segments of the tax community in the 1980s became vocal over the 
growing erratic formation of civil tax penalties, complaining about the 
ad hoc nature of penalty enactment, use of penalties as revenue raisers, 
and penalty stacking.  As a result, an IRS task force and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation produced several reports outlining the main 
theoretical goals behind a tax penalty system.  Among all the various 
rationales and purposes possible in a penalty regime, their primary 
conclusion was that tax penalties should exist solely to encourage 
voluntary compliance. 
With that goal in mind, the IRS’s task force enumerated three 
guiding principles in its penalty policy statement:  (1) helping taxpayers 
understand what constitutes acceptable conduct; (2) deterring 
noncompliance by imposing costs on that behavior; and (3) ensuring the 
perception that the tax system was fair.  Congress in 1989 reacted with 
legislation—the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax 
Act—that implemented changes to simplify accuracy-related penalties 
and information reporting penalties.  Since then, minor attention to 
additional penalty reform was given a decade later, at the end of the 
1990s, but no significant legislation resulted.  The first decade of the 
twenty-first century has only seen further movement away from 
fundamental penalty rationales and a piling up of incoherent penalties, 
with many tax observers questioning whether the current system adheres 
to the voluntary compliance goal.  
This essay examines the historical use of penalties within the tax 
code, reviews a number of reports that led to the last round of significant 
penalty reform legislation, and considers existing problems of penalty 
administration.  Several proposals are outlined to ensure that if and when 
Congress acts to simplify and revise the penalty regime, the reforms will 
have lasting impact.  Part II covers the growth of penalties in the tax 
system from its original simple form through its significant expansion to 
the time that the IRS and Congress worked to cut back the complexity of 
the civil tax penalty regime in the late 1980s.  Part III considers how 
legislative actions over the past decade have created new penalties that 
stand out from the outlined policy goals of the IRS Task Force, and the 
resulting negative impact on administering the tax code.  Part IV looks at 
2
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possible reforms to the penalty system that would institute measures to 
help constrain penalties from drifting from defined policy goals.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Penalties Historically 
Penalties were few in number and simple in application during the 
first few decades following enactment of a permanent income tax 
regime.  In 1955, after the adoption of the 1954 tax code, there were 
only fourteen penalty provisions.1  Today, the number of penalty 
provisions has grown rapidly to more than 130.2  Penalties in the 1954 
tax code centered on enforcing basic filing and understatement 
obligations through failure to file, failure to pay, negligence, and fraud 
penalties.3  These penalties were designed as simple tools to encourage 
voluntary compliance by taxpayers with our self-assessing tax system. 
  
Between 1955 and 1989, however, Congress put into place a 
number of new penalties, including sanctions on employee plans, 
exempt organizations, and return preparers4—measures not necessarily 
targeted at increasing voluntary compliance.5  The spate of individual 
tax shelters that came to the fore in the 1980s led to even more rules 
crafted by Congress and the IRS aimed at greater disclosure and punitive 
consequences for perceived taxpayer abuse of the tax code.6  Shelter-
related penalties covering promoter registration, substantial 
underpayments, and information reporting were added or refined.7  The 
current penalty regime we face today has moved well beyond basic 
filing and understatement penalties and now encompasses a wide swath 
of behavior that seems concentrated on punishing certain taxpayer 
action, including information reporting failures and valuation 
misstatements.  
 
 1. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. 2, at 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_vol2.pdf (last visited February 19, 2011) [hereinafter 
2008 NTA Report].  
 2. Id.   
 3. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 19 (1999) [hereinafter 
Treasury Report]. 
 4. Id. at 21-25. 
 5. Id. at 21. 
 6. Id. at 22-23. 
 7. Id. at 23-25. 
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It was at the height of congressional reaction to combat tax shelter 
activity through penalties that the IRS and Joint Committee on Taxation 
undertook extensive studies of the penalty system.  The review was 
necessary because “the absence of a systematic approach to the 
enactment, assertion and abatement of penalties is a serious problem.”8 
B. 1989 Reforms 
The IRS Task Force put together by then-IRS Commissioner 
Lawrence Gibbs was a broad-based effort involving research and 
feedback from nearly all divisions of the Service and was intended to 
address “complaints about the design and administration of sanctions 
[that] required principled responses based on the role of penalties in the 
tax system rather than symptomatic treatments.”9  After significant 
study, the final IRS Task Force report outlined a comprehensive basis 
for an equitable penalty regime in the tax code and set out fundamental 
characteristics of any such scheme to guide future legislative efforts.10   
Foremost among the IRS’s conclusions was that tax penalties 
should exist solely to encourage voluntary compliance.11  Because the 
U.S. tax system is based on self-assessment, using penalties to bolster 
voluntary compliance can work to make the system efficient, accurate, 
and less intrusive.12  Furthering voluntary compliance could best be 
achieved by setting out acceptable standards of conduct, imposing costs 
to deter noncompliance, and establishing a sense of fairness.13 
The IRS delineated four core pillars of sound tax penalty policy:  
fairness, effectiveness, comprehensibility, and ease of administration.14  
According to the IRS, in order to imbue the tax system with a perception 
of fairness, the tax code must treat similarly situated taxpayers the same 
(horizontal equity).15  Otherwise, taxpayers will lose respect and support 
for the tax system if they don’t think a penalty is consistently applied.16   
IRS policy states that a proper penalty regime must exhibit fairness and 
proportionality so that the penalty imposed bears the right relationship to 
 
 8. See EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE FOR THE COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 30 (1989) [hereinafter IRS Task Force Report]. 
 9. Id. at acknowledgements section. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 19.   
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 33-34. 
 14. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 19. 
 15. Id. at 39; see also I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1 (June 29, 2004). 
 16. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 40. 
4
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the taxpayer’s culpability and resulting harm to the tax system.17   The 
penalty system must operate on procedural fairness so that taxpayers are 
penalized only if they deserve it.18 
Under a second IRS goal of effectiveness, a penalty must balance 
the need to eliminate noncompliance without becoming disproportionate 
or unfair.  Essentially, effectiveness is driven by imposing costs at just 
the right level to deter violations.  One measure of effectiveness is 
basing the sanction on the level of benefit the taxpayer expects to receive 
from his noncompliance.19   On the other hand, a taxpayer should 
likewise be motivated to take remedial action upon discovering 
noncompliance.  So, a penalty should potentially offer a way for the IRS 
to use it while still encouraging voluntary correction.20  A graduated 
penalty system is an example of these factors interacting to produce an 
effective result, tying the level of sanction imposed to the length or 
severity of a taxpayer’s noncompliance.  
The IRS also believes that taxpayers must understand the conduct 
expected of them in a penalty regime (comprehensibility).  This 
principle is one of the most difficult to achieve because of the wide 
variety of knowledge and skills among taxpayers.  A penalty should 
provide for the appropriate standard of behavior based on the taxpayer’s 
sophistication, expecting a base level of conduct for average taxpayers 
while perhaps allowing for more gradation toward those with a greater 
grasp of complexity.21 
Finally, penalty administration must allow sufficient means for 
imposing a sanction while retaining the ability for the IRS to exercise 
discretion in appropriate circumstances.22   Setting out a clear and 
appropriate standard of behavior requires properly categorizing 
taxpayers based on possible noncompliant conduct.  But the level of 
detail that allows the tax administrator to follow written rules in 
determining if a sanction is applicable can come into conflict with ease 
of administration.  Ambiguous guidelines give the IRS the ability to deal 
with new or unusual factual situations, but can frustrate taxpayers when 
standards are not adequately defined.  On the other hand, an excessive 
 
 17. Id. at 41 
 18. Id. at 40. 
 19. Id. at 41-42. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PENALTY REFORM TASK 
FORCE, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 3 (2009) (“Penalties should 
treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly and have sufficient flexibility to account for differences 
in the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”) [hereinafter AICPA Report].  
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level of specificity binds the IRS’s hands or creates impractical 
administrative hurdles.23   Administrability is also affected by the penalty 
amounts at issue; if too high, either the taxpayer engages in tactics 
(sometimes questionable) to avoid it, or the IRS fears to impose it.  
Limited resources as well impact the extent to which the IRS can engage 
in administering the penalty regime.  
The IRS Task Force specifically rejected other rationales that, 
while permissible in a penalty regime, were ultimately deemed 
inconsistent with the primary goal of encouraging voluntary compliance.  
The rejected purposes included raising revenue, punishing noncompliant 
behavior, and reimbursing the government for the cost of compliance 
programs.24   For example, although penalties raise revenues collaterally, 
acceptance of revenue raising as grounds for a penalty regime “confuses 
the different roles of substantive tax rules and penalties.”25  If the goal of 
a penalty is to grow the fisc through collection, the penalty cannot be 
considered as motivated by enhancing voluntary compliance.  Indeed, a 
truly effective penalty in design would collect little or no additional 
revenue because the increase in taxpayer compliance would negate the 
need for penalty assertion.  
Pursuing penalties as a way to reimburse an administrative program 
also conflicts with enhancing voluntary compliance, as the level of 
resources necessary to administer the program “is not necessarily 
synchronized with the severity required to obtain maximum 
compliance—it may be either too high or too low.”26 
The IRS Task Force report recognized punishment as a coterminous 
mechanism for achieving voluntary compliance, but not as an 
independent goal in itself.27   Devising penalties to punish 
noncompliance can lead to severe results best dealt with in a criminal 
context.  To the extent the consequences of a penalty go beyond what is 
appropriate in a civil context, the resulting severity will likely have “an 
adverse impact on taxpayer attitudes” about the system’s fairness.28  In 
other words, a penalty should “deter bad conduct without deterring good 
conduct or punishing the innocent.”29 
 
 23. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 45 (“Either the administrator becomes a parser of 
complex rules, substituting the result required by the rule for the judgment that the case may 
require; or he bends the written rule to reach the result that he feels is reasonable.”). 
 24. Id. at 35. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 36. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1.  
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The report made several significant recommendations for tax 
administrators to follow:  adopt a single penalty policy statement 
recognizing the purpose of civil tax penalties to encourage voluntary 
compliance; develop a comprehensive penalty handbook; revise training 
programs; improve taxpayer communication regarding penalties; review 
IRS letters and notices; improve informational capabilities on penalty 
administration; and develop a comprehensive database capable of 
providing penalty administration statistical information.30  
The work of the IRS Task Force spurred Congress to take up 
wholesale reform of the civil tax penalty system.  As a result, the 1989 
Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act31 (IMPACT) 
simplified and rationalized the penalty structure, as well as spurred 
administrative changes.  One of the most significant modifications was 
the reorganization of all the accuracy-related penalties into one single 
code provision, section 6662, at a single rate (except for gross valuation 
misstatements).32  Prior to the act, penalties for negligence, substantial 
understatements, and valuation under- and overstatements had been in 
separate provisions, making it possible and likely for multiple sanctions 
to apply to one infraction.  A reasonable cause exception was 
incorporated in section 6664 and made applicable to all of the accuracy-
related penalties.  Furthermore, the legislation created a uniform 
definition of underpayment, and crafted rules so that an accuracy-related 
penalty only applied to the applicable portion of an underpayment.  
C. Post-1990 
After the major 1989 penalty overhaul, the early 1990s brought 
mostly minor legislative penalty revisions to the tax code.  In addition to 
modifying estimated tax payment rules, Congress adjusted the accuracy-
related penalty disclosure standard from “not frivolous” to “reasonable 
basis,” imposing a heightened standard to discourage taxpayers from 
taking unreasonable return positions.33  Congress also took away an 
exception to the substantial understatement penalty in the case of 
 
 30. Id.; see also I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.1(2) (Feb. 22, 2008).  
 31. Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 
103 Stat. 2106 (1989). 
 32. See id. § 7721(a). 
 33. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(1993). 
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corporate tax shelters by only allowing a penalty to be avoided in the 
case of reasonable cause.34   
But only a decade after the IMPACT reforms, the Treasury returned 
to the issue of possible penalty reform.  As part of the IRS Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998, which drastically changed the organization and 
operations of the Service, Congress mandated that the Treasury and the 
JCT again study penalty and interest provisions in the tax code.35  The 
Treasury report36 made a number of recommendations regarding various 
types of penalty provisions.  Of particular note was that the Treasury 
encouraged Congress to harmonize the substantial understatement and 
negligence penalties to better distinguish which portions of an 
understatement each related to.37  The report also recommended 
imposing the same accuracy standards on taxpayers and return 
preparers.38  The Treasury suggested that the IRS take steps to “ensure 
greater consistency in the application of penalty abatement criteria.”39 
D. IRS Efforts 
Following the enactment of IMPACT, the IRS moved to develop 
consolidated guidelines regarding penalties that captured in formal 
administrative form the policy rationales established by the IRS Task 
Force in encouraging voluntary compliance.  The IRS’s primary 
handbook for administering penalties is set forth in the various 
subsections of IRM 20.1, which outline the criteria and procedures for 
asserting, not asserting, and abating penalties.  The IRS says the IRM 
penalty is designed to be both an “everyday reference guide” as well as a 
“training document.”40   
As reflected in IRM 20.1, the IRS also eventually took the step of 
trying to establish a central coordination point within the Service to 
handle penalty policy and administration.  The IRS Office of 
Servicewide Penalties (OSP) was created and placed within the Small 
Business/Self-Employed Division’s Exam Policy branch.41  The OSP is 
 
 34. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). 
 35. See IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3801, 112 Stat. 
685, 782 (1998). 
 36. Treasury Report, supra note 3. 
 37. Id. at 109.   
 38. Id. at 6. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. See I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.2 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
 41. See id.  I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
8
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/5
11- CODER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL TAX PENALTY REFORM 161 
overseen by a program manager that presumably reports up the SB/SE 
chain.42  Yet aside from aspirational goals set out in the IRM, little is 
known about the structure and operations of the OSP.43  
The OSP is supposed to act as the clearinghouse and approval 
source for penalty guidance—at least on paper.44  In an effort to ensure 
consistency in penalty administration, the office has “overall 
responsibility” for penalty programs and updating IRM 20.1.45  But 
according to a 2009 GAO study,46 the OSP has not been fulfilling its 
obligation of comprehensively evaluating civil tax penalty 
administration and corresponding voluntary compliance efforts.  The 
office seems to have been focused more on short-term analytical goals 
while neglecting to collect the information necessary to determine the 
effectiveness of penalties.  In fact, the GAO report rapped the OSP for 
not having “a plan for fulfilling its responsibilities.”47  The GAO 
recommended that the IRS develop a plan to “focus [OSP’s] efforts” on 
its mandate.48   
The failure to collect sufficient data prevents the IRS, Treasury, and 
Congress from evaluating how penalties are operating, whether there is 
consistent application of penalties, and the effect current penalties have 
on voluntary compliance.  The GAO said a plan should be developed to 
lay out feasible research goals and identify resource requirements for the 
OSP.49  Particular data that the OSP does not currently collect includes 
the level of assessment and abatement rates for penalties, differences in 
penalty application to taxpayers based on size or representation, and 
geographical disparities in application rates.50   
 
 42. The AICPA Report, supra note 22, at page 16, suggests the OSP should be taken out from 
under SB/SE and placed under the oversight of the Deputy Commissioner of Service and 
Enforcement. 
 43. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (“Servicewide Penalties is charged with coordinating policy and 
procedures concerning the administration of penalty programs, ensuring consistency with the 
penalty policy statement, reviewing and analyzing penalty information, researching taxpayer 
attitudes and opinions, and determining appropriate action necessary to promote voluntary 
compliance.”). 
 44. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1(4) (Dec. 11, 2009) (While IRS functions “may develop additional 
guidance or reference materials for their specific functional administrative needs,” those materials 
“must receive approval from the Servicewide Penalties group.”). 
 45. Id.  I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.2.1, 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
 46. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-567, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE 
PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS (2009) [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.   
Analyses of trends in penalty data could help IRS identify areas that need further 
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In discussions with former IRS officials familiar with the 
operations of the OSP, those individuals highlighted several key 
deficiencies of the office.51  While the OSP was at one time expected to 
engage in sophisticated research, that skill is not in place.  The focus of 
the office needs to be rebalanced to include more policy concerns, as the 
primary concentration is currently on administrative functions.  Also, 
because the OSP is meant to serve as the contact point for policy 
coordination and changes to penalty guidance, there is a need to 
centralize approval processes among the various IRS functions.  The 
OSP should conduct more servicewide training on applying penalty 
provisions, in order to reinforce throughout the organization that 
penalties are never meant to be used as revenue raisers.52   
As will be seen in the next section, the IRM and the OSP, acting as 
formal structures within the IRS to handle and coordinate administrative 
penalty issues, have not fulfilled their design in helping implement the 
fundamental policy goals expressed by the IRS Task Force.  Better 
attention needs to be paid to adhering to the written intent of the penalty 
handbook and conforming administrative efforts to those guidelines.   
III.  THE CURRENT PROBLEMS 
A. A Call to Action 
A white paper produced by the American Institute for Certified 
Public Accountants cites concerns that Congress has experienced a “loss 
of direction” in the underlying theory of penalties, characterizing some 
legislative approaches as “ad hoc efforts to craft penalties and an 
increase in the use of penalties, rather than the substantive tax laws, to 
drive tax policy.”53  That admonition rings clear in light of the dearth of 
sound policy justifications for recently enacted and proposed penalty 
measures. 
 
investigation and when penalties may not be applied consistently and fairly.  For 
example, a low assessment rate could indicate that a penalty is effective deterring 
noncompliance and that the infrequency of its assessment is appropriate.  However, a 
low assessment rate might also indicate that a penalty has become outdated or is deemed 
too burdensome to assess.  Similarly, a high abatement rate could indicate that IRS 
officials are hesitant to sustain a penalty because they deem it too harsh for the 
infraction. 
Id. 
 51. February 2, 2010 telephone interview conducted by author with two former IRS senior 
leadership officials who requested anonymity to speak freely on OSP. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1. 
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Given the widespread recognition that penalties have drifted from 
the fundamental principles set out in 1989, proponents of civil tax 
penalty reform have been increasing the intensity of their calls for action 
in the past several years.  In the twenty years since the last major 
legislative overhaul of the penalty regime, critics have become 
increasingly dismayed by congressional efforts to craft penalties that no 
longer conform to a penalty structure rooted in the core goal of voluntary 
compliance.  
Several trade groups have bolstered the effort to draw attention to 
the situation by publishing new white papers on the topic.54  The reports 
have highlighted what is perceived to be a trend away from penalty 
provisions that encourage voluntary compliance and instead toward 
penalties that lack clear standards, have disproportionate impact, erode 
basic procedural due process, and are automatically assessed.55  Part of 
the problem, according to the AICPA report, stems from Congress’s 
“tendency to enact new and higher penalties rather than determine how 
to maximize the impact of existing laws and penalties.”56 
Disproportionate penalties—those where the imposition amount is 
not related to the degree of misconduct at issue or the resulting degree of 
harm—as well as stacking of penalties through overlapping provisions, 
threatens to “undermine faith in the fairness of the system,” the AICPA 
has warned.57  The American Bar Association Section of Taxation also 
produced a recent policy statement in favor of penalty reform that 
cautioned against moving away from the principles that generated the 
1989 reform legislation.58  “Nothing has changed in the past twenty 
years to change our views on these guiding principles,” the white paper 
stated.59  In particular, the paper said that creating new penalties that 
apply on top of existing penalties leads to increased complexity, 
produces multiple sanctions, and diminishes the perception that the tax 
system is reasonable.60  According to the ABA tax section, since the 
 
 54. For news coverage, see Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis:  Waiting for Penalty Reform, 
TAX NOTES TODAY 131-4 (2009). 
 55. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Id. at 9.  That view is also relayed by Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency:  
Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 2 
(2008) (“[T]axpayer compliance is linked to perceptions regarding the overall fairness of the tax 
system.  When taxpayers perceive the [IRS] as overreaching, they lose faith in the system and 
voluntary compliance is harmed.”). 
 58. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF TAXATION, STATEMENT OF POLICY 
FAVORING REFORM OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PENALTIES (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter ABA Report]. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
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passage of IMPACT, what has developed is a “confusing array of vague 
definitions and overly complicated rules.”61 
A telling review several years ago of all 130 penalty provisions in 
the tax code by the National Taxpayer Advocate showed that a good 
number of existing penalties are merely deadweight.  A 2007 listing of 
penalty assessments by statutory provision reveal that thirty-five code 
provisions had no penalty assessments in that year, and that another 
eight provisions had fewer than five assessments.62  Thus, roughly one-
third of current penalty provisions are having no effect on tax 
administration.  
The IRS task force report warned that the “absence of a unified 
approach” to the penalty regime “encourages views of penalties as a 
panacea for all compliance problems, with increases in severity 
substituting for more thoughtful attempts to solve existing compliance 
problems.”63  That admonition rings true in today’s chaotic penalty 
environment.  
B. Strict Liability  
One problematic feature of recent penalties is the frequency with 
which they contain strict liability components.  Essentially, attaching 
strict liability to a traditional penalty removes the ability for taxpayers to 
counter the penalty by showing that their action or return position should 
be excused because of reliance on accepted factors (i.e. reasonable 
cause).  
In attempting to push back against the wave of corporate tax shelter 
transactions that arose in the 1990s and led to the tax shelter litigation 
wars in the early 2000s, Congress increasingly relied on new penalty 
provisions that attempted to attack the perceived abusive behavior by 
restricting traditional penalty defenses.  These rules moved away from a 
factual inquiry-based approach with proportionate sanction amounts, and 
instead manifested “strict liability” features by disallowing reasonable 
cause relief, prohibiting judicial review, limiting waiver authority, or 
introducing narrow rescission provisions.64  Currently, there are eight 
strict liability penalty provisions in the tax code,65 including the section 
 
 61. Id. at 6. 
 62. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 40, Appendix A, Table 4 (The Number of FY 
2007 Assessments for Selected Civil Tax Penalties by Internal Revenue Code Section). 
 63. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 30. 
 64. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 9. 
 65. See Clinton Stretch, Matthew Lay & John Galotto, Economic Substance and Strict 
Liability Do Not Mix, TAX NOTES 1357, 1359 (2009).  Also, in March 2010, the Health Care and 
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6695A valuation penalties and section 6662(d) accuracy-related 
penalties for tax shelters, but the number seems to be growing as time 
passes. 
The rise in the number of penalties with strict liability provisions 
has garnered scrutiny among practitioners and academics.  When 
Congress reacts by penalizing abusive behavior, the resulting strains to 
good tax administration can overshadow and diminish much of the 
original intent behind a penalty system.  One commentator has stated 
that strict liability penalties “by definition punish taxpayers with 
mitigating circumstances, including those who attempt to comply with 
the law in good faith.”66  In binding the IRS’s hands, Congress has 
created “little agency flexibility” to fashion relief should a penalty 
provision lead to harsh unintended consequences.  The notion behind 
strict liability seems to be “in direct conflict with the reform principles 
offered by [many] important stakeholders.”67 
In the case where “taxpayers frequently violate the rule” and thus 
incur a strict liability penalty, “the penalty may not be promoting 
voluntary compliance very effectively.”68  The fact that so-called strict 
liability penalties are contested on a frequent basis also gives pause in 
considering whether the design of such penalties is appropriate.  Because 
a successful penalty should probably not be proposed or litigated very 
often, “frequent litigation could be a sign that taxpayers are not satisfied 
with the fairness of a penalty.”69  Strict liability “also negatively affects 
tax administration because it requires a higher expenditure of 
governmental resources to defend the imposition of the penalty.”70 
One strict liability penalty provides a telling example of the 
unintended severe impacts on penalty administration.  As part of the 
2004 American Jobs Creation Act,71 Congress enacted a new information 
reporting penalty, section 6707A, for failing to disclose reportable 
transactions.  As originally enacted, unless a required disclosure of a 
reportable transaction described in reg. section 1.6011-4 is made on a 
Form 8886, Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, taxpayers 
could have been assessed a $10,000 penalty for each instance of 
 
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), added section 
6662(b)(6) and (i) for transactions lacking economic substance. 
 66. Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359. 
 67. Id. at 1358. 
 68. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 15. 
 69. Id. at 13. 
 70. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359. 
 71. American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
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nondisclosure if an individual, or $50,000 if a business entity.72  The 
penalty was even higher if the transaction was a listed transaction, in 
which case the applicable penalty is $100,000 for individuals and 
$200,000 for other returns.  The statute allowed the IRS Commissioner 
to abate non-listed reportable transaction penalties, but not for listed 
transactions.73 
The primary effect in applying the old section 6707A penalty so far 
has been to assess enormous penalty amounts against taxpayers who 
failed to file Form 8886 yet recognized little to no tax benefit from a 
deemed reportable transaction.  For example, a small business owner 
who started a pension plan for her employees and paid $13,000 in taxes 
on the plan, was assessed a $1.4 million penalty for failing to disclose 
the transaction.74  Other similar instances were also documented in 
hearings before Congress in 2009.75 
Even in spite of widespread and bipartisan congressional support to 
limit application of the section 6707A penalty to truly abusive 
transactions, efforts to pass legislative modifications took a long time to 
come to fruition.  After numerous letters from congressional members 
were sent to the IRS complaining of the unintended harsh consequences 
the penalty was having on individuals and small businesses, the IRS 
announced that it was temporarily suspending collection of the section 
6707A penalty in instances where the annual tax benefit was less than 
the amount of the penalty that would have been imposed.76  The 
temporary collection suspension was extended several times by the IRS 
in hopes that Congress would eventually take concrete action on 
proposed legislation to reform the penalty.77 
Finally, as part of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, section 
6707A was amended to retroactively reduce the nondisclosure penalty 
for reportable and listed transactions to 75 percent of the nondisclosure’s 
tax benefit, with a minimum $10,000 penalty and maximum of $50,000 
 
 72. I.R.C. § 6707A (2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Small Business Council of America, Submission for the Record, Ways & Means 
Subcommittee on Oversight Hearing on IRS Operations:  The Unintended, Draconian Impact of 
Code Section 6707A – Examples In “Real Life” From Taxpayers Residing Throughout The 
Country, TAX NOTES TODAY 106-36 (2009). 
 75. See Internal Revenue Service Operations and Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposals: 
Hearing before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (statement of Ga. John Lewis, 
Chairman, Comm. on Ways & Means).   
 76. See Letter from IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman to House Ways and Means 
Committee (July 6, 2009), in TAX NOTES TODAY 128-15 (2009).  
 77. See the Small Business Penalty Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 4068, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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per reportable transaction, or maximum $200,000 for a listed 
transaction.78  The minimum penalty in the case of an individual would 
be $5,000.  There have also been legislative proposals to add a 
reasonable cause exception to section 6707A for failure to disclose a 
reportable transaction, but no significant recent movement has been seen 
on those proposed bills.79 
As noted in the GAO report, penalty amounts have to be set at 
appropriate levels to positively affect taxpayer behavior.  “Some 
penalties may be too low to change behavior but others may be so high 
that examiners are reluctant to assess them.”80  The IRS Task Force 
warned that severe sanctions “tend to be neutralized by nonimposition” 
because taxpayers fight back harder.81  According to anecdotal reports 
from practitioners, that seems to be the case in many instances where 
section 6707A could be applied.  Because the penalty amount is so high 
and the consequences so severe if asserted, IRS personnel have been 
hesitant to apply the penalty in as many cases as it might be applicable.  
Uncertainty regarding the amount of the penalty that might be imposed 
for a simple foot fault also causes high taxpayer anxiety.   
According to the GAO report, as of January 2009, the Service had 
asserted the section 6707A penalty in only ninety-eight cases for a total 
of $13.7 million.82  The inherent bind present in such circumstances is 
that penalties do little good if they are not used out of fear of swinging a 
sledgehammer to slice bread.83  As the NTA put it, “IRS employees may 
find reasons not to enforce penalties perceived to be unfairly harsh.”84 
One problem with strict liability penalties is that the intent behind 
such provisions seems to be a desire to punish taxpayers for perceived 
abusive behavior, rather than to encourage compliance.85  Yet, the tax 
law is extremely complex, made even more so by the addition of new tax 
code provisions that Congress regularly passes.  Aside from any 
attempts by some taxpayers to game the system to avoid paying taxes, 
 
 78. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504.   
 79. See S. 765, 11th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2143, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 80. See GAO Report, supra note 46, at 9. 
 81. See IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 46 (“Taxpayers, perceiving the penalty as 
unfair, tend to contest it, leading to more appeals, complaints, adverse publicity and bad relations 
between IRS and practitioners.”). 
 82. See GAO Report, supra note 46, at 14-15. 
 83. See Richard Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties, 
TAX NOTES 124 (2001).  “There is little to be gained from a penalty that is not or cannot be used 
effectively by the IRS.”  Id. 
 84. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 10.  
 85. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 10; Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359. 
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many taxpayers in regular circumstances can be uncertain of how the 
law treats certain transactions.86  Taking away the ability to show why 
certain conduct was pursued, and the motives behind it, forces taxpayers 
to shun self-correction and avoid transparency with the government—
actions directly in contrast with the stated goals of the penalty regime.  
This can lead to what policy observers characterize as “playing the audit 
lottery.”  As the ABA tax section recognized, strict liability penalties 
“eliminate the opportunity, and the incentives, to remediate and to 
become compliant.”87 
Moreover, many of the enacted strict liability penalties have been 
focused on penalizing reporting errors rather than improper behavior.  
Sticking with section 6707A as an example, many taxpayers find it 
difficult to determine if a transaction they engaged in is “substantially 
similar” to another transaction deemed reportable or listed by the IRS.88  
This can especially be the case if the transaction is considered to be “run 
of the mill” or otherwise follows generally accepted practices within the 
tax community.  Thus, a penalty for failure to properly disclose the 
transaction on a Form 8886 attached to a return and also sent to the 
Office of Tax Shelter Analysis is not a result of the substance of the 
underlying transaction, but rather is based solely on guessing that 
compliance with a special information reporting regime is required.  A 
policy that creates “traps for the unwary”89 seems to plainly violate 
horizontal equity.90 
Consistent with good tax policy, taxpayer return disclosures should 
be narrowly tailored and designed to root out specific information.  Yet 
congressional focus on tax shelters has produced statutory and 
regulatory language—such as that under sections 6662 and 6011—that 
requires additional information disclosure by a taxpayer without clearly 
defining the terrain it wants disclosed.91  The lack of transparency in this 
area regarding clearly articulated standards of behavior for taxpayers to 
 
 86. See Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax Policy Gone Wild:  Penalties as 
Revenue Raisers, TAX NOTES 4 (2007).  “A strict liability penalty is an especially harsh, if not 
inequitable, punishment in cases in which there is significant doubt as to whether the person is 
subject to liability for the penalty.”  Id. 
 87. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 10. 
 88. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 5 (bemoaning the fact that “neither the term ‘tax 
shelter’ nor ‘a significant purpose’ has been clearly defined.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 23 (“Because the penalty is not subject to a 
reasonable cause exception, it does not treat taxpayers who made similar efforts to comply 
similarly—those who fail through no fault of their own are penalized to the same extent as those 
who intentionally fail disclose a transaction—arguably failing to achieve horizontal equity.”).    
 91. See Stark, supra note 83, at 127. 
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follow leads to this disparity of treatment.  That is why the AICPA 
report knocked the current penalty system for failing to “treat similarly 
situated taxpayer similarly [with] sufficient flexibility to account for 
differences in the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”92 
A result many tax policy observers see flowing from strict liability 
provisions is increased litigation.  If there is no avenue or mechanism for 
taxpayers to present mitigating circumstances or evidence to the IRS in 
the face of an asserted penalty, taxpayers are more likely to take the 
issue to court to battle over the correctness of the underlying 
transaction.93  As one practitioner has noted, “strict liability is arguably 
appropriate only when taxpayers have violated known legal standards, 
not amorphous principles.”94  Such actions impose a greater cost on tax 
administration from having to defend the penalty assertion in a judicial 
setting.  This is not a good outcome for sound tax policy.95 
C. Limiting Reasonable Cause 
Another troubling occurrence that puts the current penalty regime at 
odds with time-honored penalty policy goals is the trend toward limiting 
the ability of taxpayers to present a defense when a penalty is imposed.  
The reasonable cause exception for accuracy-related penalties, section 
6664(c), was added to the tax code in 1989 as part of IMPACT.96  In 
order to avoid an accuracy-related penalty, a taxpayer must be able to 
show that there was a reasonable cause for the tax underpayment and 
that there was a good faith belief surrounding the taxpayer’s conduct or 
position.  Removing the defense diminishes fundamental fairness, and 
Treasury has noted that the availability of reasonable cause waivers “is 
generally sound tax policy.”97  Indeed, a reasonable cause defense has 
 
 92. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 3. 
 93. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 13.  According to the NTA 2008 annual report, the 
accuracy-related penalty was the fifth most litigated issue, accounting for about nine percent of the 
cases, where taxpayers prevailed in 43 percent such cases when represented by counsel.  The NTA 
also noted that “frequent litigation could be a sign that taxpayers are not satisfied with the fairness 
of a penalty.”  Id. 
 94. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 5. 
 95. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359 (“Strict liability also negatively affects tax 
administration because it requires a significant higher expenditure of governmental resources to 
defend the imposition of a penalty.  A penalty such as the proposed economic substance penalty will 
ensure and increase litigation as taxpayers are unable to compromise the underlying issue 
administratively with the IRS without payment of the large penalty amount.”).   
 96. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721(a), 103 Stat. 2398, 2399 (1989) (repealed). 
 97. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 125. 
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been a central component of most penalty provisions since the 1954 tax 
code.98 
One example of a penalty provision that has been introduced, with 
reasonable cause stripped away, is the recently codified economic 
substance doctrine.  As part of the reconciliation fixes to the healthcare 
reform bill,99 Congress enacted a new underpayment penalty for 
transactions that lack economic substance.  Section 6662(b)(6) makes 
noneconomic substance transactions subject to a 20 percent 
underpayment penalty, and section 6662(i) increases the penalty to 40 
percent if the transaction was not separately disclosed.  Of significant 
importance is that sections 6664(c)(2) and (d)(2) were added to remove 
the reasonable cause exception for any penalty applied to noneconomic 
substance transactions, including reportable transactions described in 
section 6662(b)(6).  These restrictions on providing a penalty defense 
come despite considerable taxpayer uncertainty on when the economic 
substance doctrine will apply.  Valuation penalties and tax shelters are 
other areas where reasonable cause is similarly lacking.100 
The ABA tax section white paper strongly condemned 
congressional attempts to foreclose the opportunity for taxpayers to 
present mitigating evidence when faced with a penalty assessment.  “All 
penalties should be subject to a reasonable cause and good faith defense 
and no penalty should be imposed without affording an opportunity to 
the party who may be sanctioned to defend the conduct,” the paper 
said.101  The concern is that removing reasonable cause does not address 
abusive transactions or increase voluntary compliance, while at the same 
time it greatly increases compliance costs.102  The paper further declared 
that “fundamental fairness requires that taxpayers be permitted an 
opportunity to contest penalties, and to demonstrate why penalties are 
not appropriate in a particular situation.”103 
There is worry that Congress could go even further in placing limits 
on the reasonable cause defense.  Although not adopted as part of the 
healthcare reform legislation that also codified the economic substance 
doctrine, H.R. 3962 proposed to make some corporations subject to a 
more likely than not standard for avoiding penalties on tax 
 
 98. Id. at 120. 
 99. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (as signed into law on March 30, 2010). 
 100. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6664(c)(3), 6695A, 6662(d)(2)(B) (2006). 
 101. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 9. 
 102. Id. at 10. 
 103. Id. at 9. 
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underpayments.104  The proposed legislation would have changed section 
6664(c)(3)(A) to make the standard subsection (c)(1) reasonable cause 
exception for underpayments inapplicable to certain companies unless 
the entity met the more likely than not standard for any given return 
position.  The affected companies—“specified persons”—would be 
corporations that have more than $100 million in gross receipts in any 
tax year or that are publicly traded entities with filing requirements 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Those conditions 
encompass a large number of corporate taxpayers with long, complicated 
returns as a result of normal business activity, and the provisions could 
lead to related problems for companies subject to FIN 48 accounting 
rules.  
Section 6662(d)(2) would also have been amended under the bill to 
prevent application of the “substantial authority” and “reasonable basis” 
standards to reduce underpayments for any specified person.  This 
undermines recent efforts to increase taxpayer transparency.  The 
legislation would affect underpayments arising from transactions entered 
into after the enactment date, providing companies with scant time to 
implement adequate internal control procedures before any guidance 
from the Service could be issued.  
While Congress should be concerned about motivating proper 
taxpayer behavior, the circumstances addressed by H.R. 3962 have little 
to do with compliance.  The broad sweep of proposed section 563 of the 
bill would affect all corporate transactions, not just those considered tax 
shelters under section 6662.  Routine non-tax-motivated transactions that 
encompass unsettled legal issues would be prime targets.  A legitimate 
worry is the effect the proposed penalty will have on non-shelter 
transactions, as it is not uncommon for large corporations to be unable to 
reach the more likely than not standard if there are multiple possible 
interpretations of the law.105  For example, if a taxpayer in a common 
capitalization issue took a deduction rather capitalizing a repair expense, 
and if the IRS felt the entity took the wrong return position, the company 
could wind up facing underpayment penalties with no reasonable cause 
or other defense.106  And with corporate reporting obligations under FIN 
48, the IRS could put companies on the hook for penalties if it 
 
 104. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).   
 105. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis:  Corporate Penalties in House Healthcare Bill Cause 
Concerns, TAX NOTES TODAY 218-1 (2009) (quoting Michael Desmond, former Treasury 
legislative counsel).  
 106. Id. 
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questioned whether financial reserves were based on a more likely than 
not standard.  
In this instance, Congress has found easy money in potentially 
collecting penalties for any mistakes large or public corporations make 
by simply raising the applicable standard regardless of conduct, while 
allowing smaller, shelter-motivated transgressors to avoid enhanced 
penalty standards.  The administration and Congress should be 
considering appropriate penalties, but in the context of wholesale 
reform, in order to improve tax system administration.  Focusing on 
discrete penalty provisions that raise revenue but add complexity, while 
singling out a subset of taxpayers because of their ability to pay, is the 
wrong approach.  Policy is important when it comes to penalties and the 
lack of a cognizant rationale for proposed penalties, such as those in 
H.R. 3962, will only weaken the system. 
Limiting penalty defenses as part of a rules-based system will also 
only serve to increase unintended consequences.  One commentator has 
observed that removal of the IRS’s authority to waive penalties can be 
seen as a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to properly 
weigh when waiver is appropriate.107  Carving out particular penalties to 
which reasonable cause does not attach runs counter to what Congress 
identified in IMPACT as key rationales for having such a defense.108  It 
was expected that a reasonable cause exception would help taxpayers 
“more easily understand the standards of behavior that is required” of 
them, and that the defense would “simplify the administration of these 
penalties by the IRS.”109 
D. Lack of Procedural Rights 
Another feature of several recently enacted penalty provisions is the 
elimination of judicial review of certain penalty determinations.  Section 
6707A is an example in this regard, as taxpayers cannot challenge in 
court the IRS Commissioner’s refusal to abate the penalty.110  Yet, 
“judicial review of an IRS decision to impose a penalty or to deny 
waiver is an important constitutional check on executive authority.”111  
Congressional reaction to IRS lapses regarding tax shelters by removing 
 
 107. See Stark, supra note 83, at 121.  “[It] reflects a lack of faith (perhaps self-fulfilling) in the 
ability of the IRS and the courts to administer discretionary waivers.”  Id. 
 108. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 37-39. 
 109. See H.R. REP. NO. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1392-93 (1989). 
 110. I.R.C. § 6707A(d)(2) (2006).  However, taxpayers can still contest application of the 
penalty in the first place.  
 111. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 11.  
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certain traditional procedural rights reflects “the height of hubris to think 
that an occasional mistake in the administration of penalties warrants the 
elimination of the opportunity for administrative judgment calls.”112 
Fairness is one of the underlying concerns at play here.  Outside of 
the strict liability context, when mitigating circumstances exist, 
taxpayers are afforded the chance to the present those facts to the IRS 
for its discretion in administering penalties.113  If a taxpayer is no longer 
able to rely on that discretion, the IRS is deprived of the ability to 
exercise consistency and impartiality across the board to all taxpayers.114  
It also harms the effectiveness of the tax system when the penalty must 
be applied in inappropriate circumstances but mitigation is foreclosed.  
The discretion available to the IRS should be “appropriately calibrated” 
so that “IRS personnel have neither too much nor too little discretion.”115  
There is tension between noncompliance resulting from honest taxpayer 
mistakes and willful noncompliance, and a similar incongruence 
between administrative simplicity and complexity.  If the IRS doesn’t 
pay attention to either penalty design or administration, “the penalties 
may be unfair in their application to situations involving different 
underlying causes.”116 
Policy advocates also are distressed by the fact that penalties can be 
imposed on taxpayers for transactions entered into and reported on a 
return before the IRS makes a determination that a transaction is 
reportable.117  For example, in the case of reportable transactions, the 
IRS can issue a notice that a particular transaction is “listed” and thus 
subject to specific disclosure standards or else a penalty applies.118  But 
it can be several years after a taxpayer’s transaction occurs that the IRS 
determines it is abusive and crafts rules to clamp down on such 
 
 112. See Stark, supra note 83, at 142.  Stark also warned that “removing waiver authority 
creates a Procrustean bed that can and will deflect energy from regulating overly aggressive conduct 
and toward debate regarding the perceived procedural unfairness of abolishing traditional defenses 
and ambiguously defining critical terms.”  Id. at 147. 
 113. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 38 (“administrative discretion also is exercised in 
evaluating the facts and circumstances weighing for or against imposition of a penalty”). 
 114. Id. (“Fairness requires that this discretion be exercised with consistency and impartiality 
such that similar situations are not treated differently.”). 
 115. Id. (“Fairness also involves providing taxpayers with opportunity to have their interests 
heard and considered.”). 
 116. Id. at 37. 
 117. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 6 (“In the case of listed transactions and transactions 
of interest, ‘participation’ may be defined in the notice identifying the transaction as a listed 
transaction or a transaction of interest.  These notices can be issued years after the tax year in which 
the transaction occurred, compounding the problem of complying up front with vague standards.”). 
 118. See I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6111, 6112 and accompanying regulations (2006). 
21
Coder: Achieving Meaningful Civil Tax Penalty Reform and Making It Stick
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
11- CODER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:25 PM 
174 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [27:153 
transactions.  The retroactivity of applying new rules to completed 
transactions flies in the face of fair notice to the taxpayer of what 
conduct is acceptable.119 
More and more, the IRS is using automated processes to assess 
penalties on taxpayers.120  These administrative mechanisms put 
taxpayers in a tough position if they are not afforded the ability to 
contest penalties before payment is expected by the Service.121  
Automatic penalty application should still allow the taxpayer “an 
opportunity to demonstrate why the penalties are not applicable to a 
particular situation.”122  And inconsistencies regarding which penalties 
have pre-assessment rights makes it unfair for a taxpayer to dispute one 
penalty but not another.  The ABA tax section white paper warned that 
“the perception of fairness in the administration of civil tax penalties is 
critical to fostering taxpayer’s respect for the tax law.”123  
The fear is that it is possible for the IRS to abuse its position when 
a taxpayer has no direct recourse to dispute a penalty determination.124  
Without adequate oversight or instruction, examining agents can have 
relative immunity for taking an aggressive interpretation that a taxpayer 
did not have authority to take a certain return position and thus is subject 
to an accuracy-related penalty.  While widespread abuse by the IRS is 
unlikely, even a few isolated examples of egregious circumstances can 
cause substantial damage to the tax system’s reputation.125  The 1999 
Treasury report cautioned that “the manner or methods by which the IRS 
collects taxes and deals with taxpayers may be as important as the 
penalty and interest provisions in affecting compliance.”126 
Penalty abatement is a longstanding and frequent occurrence by the 
IRS, as borne out by IRS data.  For example, numbers supplied by the 
 
 119. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 6. 
 120. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 16. 
 121. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 11.  “In general, this would include the right to an 
independent review by the IRS Appeals office, as well as access to the courts.  Pre-assessment 
rights are particularly important where the underlying tax provision or penalty standards are 
complex, the amount of the penalty is high, or fact-specific defenses such as reasonable cause are 
available.”  Id. 
 122. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 8. 
 123. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 124. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 4 (noting that the lack of “protection against 
potentially arbitrary or capricious actions by the commissioner” are “objectionable from a 
fundamental due process standpoint as well as on sound tax policy grounds.”). 
 125. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1361 (“A similar cynicism caused by application of the 
[codified economic substance] penalty to sympathetic taxpayers would have a corrosive effect on 
compliance.”). 
 126. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 40. 
22
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/5
11- CODER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL TAX PENALTY REFORM 175 
annual IRS data book for years 2007 through 2009 show that the IRS 
regularly abates roughly 30 percent of penalties for individual taxpayers, 
including accuracy-related penalties, and has abated penalties for 
corporate taxpayers in the range of 45 to 70 percent each year.127  Stark 
has described this as a picture of “virtually inevitable administrative 
reversal of proposed accuracy-related penalties.”128  And the NTA has 
said that “frequent penalty abatements could reflect a problem in the 
underlying tax assessment process.”129 
E. Penalties as Revenue Raisers 
By their nature, penalties have the incidental effect of raising 
revenue by imposing a cost on noncompliance.  But using penalties as a 
direct tool to raise money is inapposite to the goals of a properly 
functioning penalty system as it puts the focus on offsetting other tax 
changes rather than encouraging voluntary compliance.130  Yet that 
seems to be a motive—indirect, if not perhaps direct—behind some of 
the recent penalty enactments and proposals.131 
Critics have spoken frequently on the dangers of using penalties as 
revenues raisers, warning that such use leads to serious damage to the 
underlying principles of IRS penalty policy.  As noted by the ABA tax 
section, “looking to penalties to offset tax expenditures risks 
incentivizing the Service to impose and to sustain penalties—particularly 
large dollar penalty amounts—wherever it can be done, regardless of 
whether penalties are appropriate in a particular case, and regardless of 
the consequences for the tax system that can result from even the 
perception of random or unfair application of tax penalties.”132 
One practitioner has characterized revenue raising through the use 
of strict liability penalties as “poor tax policy and an unsatisfactory 
rationale.”133  Indeed, the same practitioner has openly criticized 
 
 127. See Jeremiah Coder, Data Book Snapshot:  2009 Civil Penalties and Chief Counsel 
Workload, TAX NOTES 1454 (2010). 
 128. See Stark, supra note 83, at 139. 
 129. See NTA 2008 Report, supra note 1, at 15. 
 130. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 36.  “Penalties may raise revenue collaterally but 
this should not be a deliberate objective of penalty design and doing so can create perverse 
incentives.”  Id.   
 131. See Mik Shin-Li, Strictly Wrong As a Tax Policy:  The Strict Liability Penalty Standards 
in Noneconomic Substance Transactions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 17 (2010-2011) (“Tax penalties as 
revenue raisers at best involve mixed motives and at worst become arbitrary punishment of the 
taxpayers, which is not within the role of tax penalties.”). 
 132. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 11. 
 133. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 2. 
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Congress for its “avowed and all-too-transparent purpose for enacting 
strict liability penalties without judicial recourse [in order] to raise 
revenue.”134 
Government officials have privately admitted that money inflows 
expected from certain penalty proposals are part of a penalty’s attraction.  
In regard to attempts to codify the economic substance doctrine, with its 
attached strictly liability penalty, Joshua Odintz, former tax counsel to 
the Senate Finance Committee, remarked at a 2007 conference that 
“whether economic substance codification is good policy or not, it’s 
money on the table.”135  Former Treasury tax legislative counsel Michael 
Desmond likewise acknowledged that economic substance codification 
and penalties have been popular among congressional members because 
there is “a lot of money associated with [it].”136 
But one of the problems in looking at penalties as a means for 
budget offsets is the inherent difficulty of placing a monetary value on 
them.  The attempt to codify the economic substance doctrine is a prime 
example of valuation uncertainties.  A proposal in the 109th Congress to 
codify the economic substance doctrine was scored by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation at around $17 billion.137  Subsequent legislative 
proposals have progressively seen the associated revenue score drop 
measurably.  In 2007, a JCT score of a codification proposal was 
estimated at $10 billion.  The JCT estimate for the 2010 reconciliation 
package that finally enacted economic substance codification was 
pegged at only $4.5 billion.138  The inherent difficulty of predicting 
taxpayer behavior makes revenue-guessing quite speculative in the area 
of penalties.139  As previously alluded to in the beginning background 
section of this essay, “the best penalty would be the one that is so 
 
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Economic Substance Codification Coming, TAX 
NOTES TODAY 196-3 (2007). 
 136. See Jeremiah Coder, Desmond Says Legislative Outlook Driven by Pay-Go, TAX NOTES 
TODAY 107-2 (2007). 
 137. See JCT Scores Senate-Passed Tax Relief Act (JCX-9-06), TAX NOTES TODAY 27-14 
(2006).   
 138. See JCT Estimates Budget Effects of Combined Housing Healthcare Reform Legislation 
(JCX-17-10), TAX NOTES TODAY 55-22 (2010). 
 139. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5 n.11 (“Revenue generated directly from new 
penalties can be taken into account in connection with the federal budget ‘scoring’ process, but any 
resulting effect on voluntary compliance can probably not be taken into account given the lack of 
quantitative research in this area.”). 
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effective it virtually eliminates noncompliance and thus results in no 
penalty revenues.”140 
It is particularly discouraging that, on Capitol Hill, some lawmakers 
have forsaken essential penalty principles and now believe that penalties 
should be pursued simply because they raise revenue.  Congress needs 
lots of money to fund its long list of legislative priorities, but subverting 
tax policy to get that money is wrong.  As already stated, there is scant 
support for the theory that efforts to put a dollar amount on what penalty 
provisions might raise are even reasonable.  The 2008 National 
Taxpayer Advocate report lamented that “policymakers lack the 
information they need . . . to accurately estimate the budget effect of 
changes to the penalty rules.”141  What is certain is that corporate costs 
will increase as companies to try to meet higher standards of authority—
whether at a more likely than not or some other threshold—because 
sometimes it just simply is not possible for a company to get to more 
likely than not on certain tax positions when the tax law is not clear.  So 
corporations subject to the proposed penalty provisions would either 
have to expend significant resources trying to cover themselves with 
strong opinions, or not even try out of a sense of futility. 
F. Tax Shelter Effects 
Many of the changes in the past decade to the tax code regarding 
penalty provisions have been driven by the government’s increasing 
desire to combat tax shelters.  Indeed, reportable transactions and strict 
liability penalties that have radically changed the penalty system are the 
result of an overreaction by Congress to a small segment of taxpayers 
abusing the tax code to avoid paying taxes.  But are tax shelter-driven 
reforms good for the tax system?  The author believes not.  
The creation of tax shelter penalties in particular tend to arise from 
lack of enforcement of current penalty provisions and so often end up 
producing a “stacked” effect.  The main effect of stacking—whereby 
multiple penalties overlap in applying to a particular transaction—is to 
produce aggregate penalty amounts that are disproportionate to the 
degree of misconduct or harm.142  Another result is over-disclosure, 
 
 140. See Stark, supra note 83, at 121.  That view is mirrored by former IRS commissioner N. 
Jerold Cohen.  See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Shelter Penalties are Unclear and Weakly Enforced, 
Panelists Say, TAX NOTES TODAY 145-3 (2008) (quoting Cohen, “But the best penalties are those 
that don’t raise any revenue because they encourage the conduct that the penalty is designed to 
encourage.”). 
 141. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
 142. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 7. 
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which causes taxpayers to have to report positions for which they have 
adequate authority and only swamps the IRS with additional forms to 
process.143   
Fundamentally, the underlying policy goals of tax administration 
devoted to voluntary compliance are sound and should not be jettisoned 
in response to the attacks emanating from tax shelters.144  The 
overarching goals of fairness, comprehensibility, effectiveness, and ease 
of administration remain and can stand up to the challenges posed by tax 
law manipulations.  Just as in the past, our tax system will weather this 
cycle of shelter activity, but it should do so while staying true to the 
fundamentals of its penalty regime.  
IV.  POSSIBLE REFORMS 
The problem with any reform of the civil penalty tax system is 
making it stick so that future penalties do not go astray from promoting 
voluntary compliance.  Although restructuring may work for a while, 
history has shown that the trend is for Congress to eventually go back to 
instituting new penalties misaligned with overall policy goals, and for 
the IRS to craft a complicated compliance regime.  That certainly has 
been the fact after the past several attempts at major penalty reform.  As 
Tax Court Judge Robert Wherry acknowledged in conference remarks in 
2010, past efforts have only borne short-term fruit:  even with the great 
strides of IMPACT, the last round of penalty reform “didn’t get the job 
done.”145 
Some will view the following ideas as far-fetched and impractical.  
Both are potentially valid criticisms, but the proposals at least serve as 
an initial framework for (hopefully) serious discussion about the issue of 
comprehensive penalty reform.  
A. Penalty Review 
Increasing the frequency or scope of review of penalties by 
Congress and the IRS/Treasury is not necessarily a new or unexpected 
 
 143. See Coder, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 4 (quoting Tom 
Ochsenschlager as saying that over-disclosure will not be effective because the IRS can’t handle the 
volume, and taxpayers shouldn’t have to disclose transactions for which they have adequate support.  
“Substantial authority is an appropriate standard.”). 
 144. However, for a bleaker assessment, see id. (quoting a practitioner as saying:  “In my 
practice, I’ve never seen penalties be a deterrent factor in any action taken by a taxpayer.”). 
 145. See Jeremiah Coder, Practitioners, Officials Debate Prospect of Civil Penalty Reform, 
TAX NOTES TODAY 16-5 (2010). 
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proposal.  Legislation enacted in 2010 requires annual reports by the IRS 
to Congress on penalties assessed for undisclosed reportable 
transactions—the section 6707A penalty—as well as other tax shelter 
penalties, including sections 6662A, 6700(a), 6707, and 6708.146  
Stakeholder groups also recognize the value that comes from having 
better penalty information available, calling for the IRS to provide 
“periodic and increased analysis and reporting on effectiveness of 
penalty administration.”147 
The NTA has been particularly vocal regarding the necessity of an 
improved penalty reporting system.  The 2008 NTA report took the IRS 
to task for having “no significant quantitative data to show how penalties 
affect voluntary compliance.”148  The report lamented the fact that: 
the IRS either does not assess or does not track assessment of many 
current penalties, much less study them in a comprehensive manner.  
As a result, policymakers lack the information they need to structure 
and administer tax penalties to maximize voluntary compliance or even 
to accurately estimate the budget effect of changes to the penalty 
rules.149 
The “dearth of information” surrounding penalties frustrate 
effective review of the system.  “The Service does not regularly make 
public reports of its efforts to comply with [IRS Policy Statement 20-
1],” the ABA paper complained.150  The information provided by the 
IRS, mainly through its annual data book, is helpful only to a limited 
degree because of the aggregation format into broad penalty categories.  
Further, mining the data and delivering more targeted reports would be 
of tremendous assistance to tax policymakers.151  The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has asked Congress to direct the IRS to “conduct an empirical 
study to quantify the effect of each penalty on voluntary compliance.”152 
More comprehensive reporting of penalty data would significantly 
enhance the ability of Congress and tax administrators to evaluate how 
penalties, as applied in practice, are affecting tax administration.   
 
 146. See Small Business Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2103, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010). 
 147. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 13. 
 148. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 13. 
 151. See Stark, supra note 83, at 120.  “[N]ot much has been done to follow penalties more 
closely.  Penalty statutes, like the substantive law, have been constantly amended and updated, 
drawing into question the comparability of data from year to year.”  Id. 
 152. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 6. 
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B. Increasing Certainty 
Many of the heated discussions stemming from the recently enacted 
accuracy-related and information reporting penalties in sections 6662, 
6662A, 6707, 6707A, and 6694 are a direct byproduct of Congress’s 
inability to write clear rules for taxpayers and practitioners to follow.  A 
good number of tax literature pages have been devoted to complaining 
about the difficulty in following the tax law because of perceived 
ambiguity.  Thus, part of the solution to an unmoored penalty regime 
needs to be a greater emphasis within Congress, and by extension, the 
IRS, in creating regulations on producing guidance to clarify the vast 
pools of tax law uncertainty.153 
Many tax return positions result from uncertainty about the law, 
especially when it comes to recently enacted code provisions.  Because 
there may be contradictory judicial interpretations or no guidance in a 
particular area of tax law, corporations engaged in complicated business 
transactions may lack confidence about treatment of a tax issue.  As one 
practitioner noted, “taxpayers should not be punished for taking good-
faith tax positions.”154  Yet the proposed legislation in H.R. 3962 would 
also have eliminated the penalty protection afforded taxpayers for 
specifically disclosing an uncertain tax position to the IRS, running in 
direct contrast to government efforts to increase transparency and bring 
about more disclosure of uncertain tax positions. 
In recognition of those compliance difficulties, the IRS seems to be 
shifting toward greater willingness to issue “pretty good” guidance to 
resolve some issues in a timely manner instead of taking years to 
comprehensively tackle all compliance uncertainties for a particular tax 
issue.155 
C. Graduated Penalties 
Establishing more penalties with a graduated structure could help 
solve some of the problems associated with strict liability.  As Stark puts 
it, “stepped” penalties respond so that “the more egregious conduct and 
the less responsive taxpayers are penalized more seriously.”156  The 
 
 153. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359.  “[T]he factors identified by Treasury and the 
IRS in guidance are able to drive taxpayer or preparer behavior.”  Id.    
 154. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis:  Corporate Penalties in House Healthcare Bill Cause 
Concerns, TAX NOTES TODAY 218-1 (2009). 
 155. See Amy S. Elliott, ‘Pretty Good’ Guidance Should Be Good Enough for IRS, Official 
Says, TAX NOTES TODAY 233-4 (2010).  
 156. See Stark, supra note 83, at 124. 
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section 6651 failure to file penalty is an example of a penalty rate 
increasing in some proportion to the perceived egregiousness of the 
noncompliance.  The penalty is imposed at a rate of 5 percent per month 
past the date a return is due, and caps out at a maximum of 25 percent.  
So a taxpayer filing his return one month late would pay a 5 percent 
penalty on the net amount of unpaid tax, would pay 10 percent if filing 
two months late, and so on.  The failure to pay penalty operates in a 
similar fashion.  One scholar has opined that graduated rates make a 
“penalty much milder for many taxpayers.”157 
The 1999 Treasury report recognized that a penalty regime must 
“distinguish among the different underlying causes of 
noncompliance.”158  It recommended that the section 6651 failure to file 
penalty be further revised to reduce the penalty to 0.5 percent for the 
first 6 months, and increasing to 1 percent a month beyond that, up to a 
maximum 25 percent cap.159  The proposal was based on the belief that 
getting rid of the front-loading nature of the penalty would “provide 
continuing incentive for correction” to encourage noncompliant 
taxpayers to get right sooner rather than later, if at all.160  
The principle of targeting noncompliance through penalty amounts 
that best correspond to the level of culpability or harm to the system is 
worth serious consideration, and a graduated system can give effect to 
that objective.  That seems to be part of the calculus in amended section 
6707A.  Tying the penalty amount for section 6707A in between the 
minimum floor and maximum cap thresholds to 75 percent of the 
resulting tax benefit that was not disclosed is a better start than imposing 
a blanket unreviewable fine.  
An even better solution though would be to base the section 6707A 
penalty amount on some sort of time scale like the one used in section 
6651.  Currently, the automatic penalty of $100,000 for individuals with 
listed transactions provides no motivation for self-correction if the 
taxpayer discovers post-filing that the transaction should have been 
reported; the lack of incentive to file amended returns leaves some 
taxpayers willing to play the audit lottery.  Something akin to an 
increasing penalty rate by month seems to be a more reasonable 
mechanism to structure the penalty so as to encourage voluntary 
compliance with the tax code rather than swinging the hammer with no 
 
 157. See William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 41 
(2009). 
 158. Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 37. 
 159. Id. at 67. 
 160. Id. at 65. 
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chance of limited relief.  Because the noncompliance at issue in section 
6707A and other information reporting penalties is disclosure rather than 
substantive tax law, a graduated arrangement make sense.161 
D. Penalty Sunsets 
A possible mechanism for enhancing the effectiveness of the 
penalty system is requiring regular congressional review of existing 
penalty provisions.  Essentially, this could be accomplished via a 
mandatory sunset of most penalties, say every five years.  
What this might accomplish is a recurring review of the 
justification for, and practical administrative effects of, certain civil tax 
penalties.  Far too often, after significant penalty reform is achieved, 
Congress gums up the system with additional penalties that forsake the 
voluntary compliance imperative.  This leads to the complexity, 
stacking, and unintended consequences that has consistently occurred 
over a period of time.  Over time, penalties may fall into disuse; 
legislative review would help remove unnecessary provisions from an 
already lengthy and complex tax code. 
If the IRS, through the OSP or another investigative reporting 
mechanism, provided detailed analysis of how the penalty regime is 
operating, Congress could, on a frequent basis, reexamine how to best 
encourage voluntary compliance and stick to the overarching goals of 
penalties in tax administration.  There are already a number of tax law 
provisions that expire on a regular basis.  For example, a panoply of tax 
credits (so-called tax extenders) comes up every calendar year for 
Congress to routinely reauthorize.  So renewing penalties on a 
predetermined cycle is not without precedent.  
The author admits that the effectiveness of penalty sunsets is 
uncertain.  After all, in the debate surrounding extension of expiring tax 
credit provisions each year, the focus of members of Congress are not 
always on a substantive review of such laws, but rather the aggregate 
cost and required offsets.  However, it is arguably easier to provide for 
ongoing legislative tinkering with penalty sections rather than relying on 
the uncertainty of when Congress might have the fortitude to tackle even 
one or two particular penalty provisions.  If the history of recent 
legislative action on tax provisions is any indicator of the future, it will 
become more and more difficult for Congress to muster the will to tackle 
 
 161. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 26.  As the 2008 NTA report noted in connection 
with the section 6651 penalty, it is better to make a penalty “more proportionate to the length of the 
delinquency, without increasing the rate to such an extent that the penalty itself discourages filing.”   
30
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/5
11- CODER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL TAX PENALTY REFORM 183 
changes to the tax code, especially when doing so requires revenue 
offsets.  
A recurring opportunity to review penalty provisions would allow 
taxpayers and practitioners to make a strong case for tweaking or 
eliminating penalties that are not working in line with outlined tax policy 
goals.  Requiring Congress to affirmatively vote to continue a particular 
penalty could provide hope that the penalty system will be purged on 
repeated intervals so as to avoid the penalty creep that often necessitates 
wholesale reform.  It is better to compel regular flushings than wait for 
the dam to burst.  
E. Penalty Ombudsman 
Another suggestion is for Congress to establish a centralized role 
within the government to handle penalty data and policy.  This would be 
in keeping with a recent trend toward expanding ombudsman functions 
within the federal government.162 
Admittedly, the creation of the OSP was supposed to handle such 
functions.163  But if the IRS continues to neglect full utilization of the 
office, giving some measure of authority to a penalty ombudsman could 
help ensure better penalty information collection and its distillation to 
the tax community.164  While pending legislative proposals would 
require annual reports to Congress of reportable transaction 
nondisclosure penalties, regular reports to the legislative branch should 
encompass the whole penalty regime.  A single function devoted to the 
work necessary to produce this report should be established.  
Because of the important role penalties play in the healthy 
functioning of our voluntary assessment tax system, comprehensive and 
detailed analysis of how penalties are operating is essential.  A useful 
model is the National Taxpayer Advocate.  A penalty point person 
would not necessarily need to have the visibility or range of authority 
that the NTA possesses, because the Taxpayer Advocate Service 
 
 162. SEE TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. 2: RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 107 
(2009), available at  http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 
2011) (TAS identified 44 federal ombudsmen offices in 2009, up from 26 identified in 2003). 
 163. See I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
 164. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 16 (“The IRS should evaluate whether the 
Servicewide Penalties Group is the best office to have overall responsibility for penalty 
administration and if so, whether the placement of that office within the IRS organization is optimal 
to allow that office to perform its mission, including evaluating and coordinating penalty 
administration throughout the major Operating Divisions.”). 
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operates on a broad spectrum of assisting taxpayers across all 
administrative functions.  But just as the NTA is able to make a strong 
case for correcting tax system deficiencies, a penalty ombudsman 
focused solely on penalty issues could effectively advocate for needed 
changes to the penalty regime while keeping tabs on the day-to-day 
functioning of penalties in the tax system.  
V.  CONCLUSION  
The drift over two decades away from solid principles of what 
should constitute the penalty system, drawn from careful study, has left 
the current system in a disconcerting place.  Despite occasional 
rumblings of tackling penalty reform, real strides toward that end might 
not be made until the IRS again takes the lead.  As indicated by both the 
GAO and NTA reports, the real need is for the Service to gather 
appropriate empirical data on how penalties are working in the current 
system.  The Taxpayer Advocate has emphasized that “policymakers 
lack the information they need to structure and administer tax penalties 
to maximize voluntary compliance or even to accurately estimate the 
budget effect of changes to the penalty rules.”165 
Attempts by both the GAO and the NTA to produce meaningful 
measurements on penalties were largely unsuccessful, highlighting the 
need for action by the IRS.  Indeed, the NTA report specifically 
recommended that Congress have the Service “collect and analyze more 
detailed penalty data on a regular basis” and “conduct an empirical study 
to quantify the effect of each penalty on voluntary compliance.”166 
It is unlikely that the legislative staffs on Capitol Hill have the data 
or resources to pull together an exhaustive study on tax penalties.  So it 
will be up to the IRS to initiate a tax penalty project—perhaps a working 
group similar to the 1980s task force.  The question is whether this is a 
task the Service is willing to take on right now, because there already are 
substantial new administrative tax programs in play, including IRS 
projects that regulate tax return preparers and another requiring 
corporate reporting of uncertain tax positions.  
Penalty reform has languished for years despite a critical need for 
it, but it is uncertain whether the political will to maintain a serious 
dialogue on the subject exists.  An outward commitment by the IRS in 
reestablishing a penalty reform task force could be an effective 
mechanism toward eventual legislative overhaul.  Despite the 
 
 165. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
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considerable resources that such a project would involve, it is a goal 
worth pursuing.  Returning to the fundamental principles expressed by 
the 1989 IRS Task Force is essential because that probing document was 
designed to be a “guide for future legislative efforts and administrative 
actions.”167  Furthermore, those recommendations still hold true today.   
The challenge ahead is that once significant penalty reform is 
achieved, Congress and the IRS must ensure that it is long-lasting.  A 
number of the proposals in this paper would help focus Congress and the 
IRS on sustaining the improvements made to the penalty regime.  
Establishing a process for more detailed reporting of penalty information 
will aid thoughtful examination of penalty operations within tax 
administration.  A penalty ombudsman to act as a champion for data 
collection, good administrative practices, and legislative 
recommendations would help consolidate responsibilities that are 
currently housed in a variety of agency functions.  Requiring Congress 
to reauthorize penalty provisions on a regular basis might give taxpayers 
and tax administrators a better opportunity to examine deficiencies in the 
existing penalty structure and suggest appropriate modifications.  
The pursuit to keep our tax penalty system fair, effective, 
comprehensible, and administrable so as to drive voluntary taxpayer 
compliance is worth this effort.  
 
 167. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at acknowledgements section. 
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